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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Our immigration laws have long required foreign-born 
children of citizens to reside or be physically present in the 
United States for some amount of time to retain citizenship. In 
extraordinary cases, these retention requirements can be con-
structively satisfied if circumstances prevented the foreign-
born individual from complying with the statute. But while eq-
uity may allow someone to retain citizenship, it has only sup-
ported transmitting that retained citizenship to a descendant in 
rare cases—typically, when a government error causes citizen-
ship to lapse. 
 
Here, we consider whether Jozef Madar is a citizen. 
Madar argues that he is because his father constructively satis-
fied the statutory requirements for retaining citizenship and 
transmitted this citizenship to Madar himself. Because Madar’s 
father, even if he were a citizen, did not transmit citizenship 
under a constructive physical presence theory, we will affirm 




Madar was born in communist-ruled Czechoslovakia in 
1964 and entered the United States in 1991. After overstaying 
his visa, he settled in the Pittsburgh area. He has litigated his 
legal status in the decades since his arrival. In this proceeding, 
Madar seeks a declaration that he is a United States citizen be-
cause his late father, Jozef Madar, Sr., was a citizen, and his 
father’s citizenship transmitted to him. Untangling this citizen-




Madar’s paternal grandmother, Julianne Cikovsky, was 
born in 1906 in Youngstown, Ohio. As she entered her teenage 
years, she left the United States to settle in Czechoslovakia. 
She married there and gave birth to a son, Madar, Sr., in 1940. 
Madar, Sr. lived in Czechoslovakia—and after its dissolution, 
Slovakia—his entire life. Madar, Sr. never lived in the United 
States. In the 1960s, Madar, Sr. married a non-United States 
citizen in Czechoslovakia and had children. One child was the 
petitioner, Madar. 
 
Madar, Sr. knew of his mother’s American birth, but he 
did not know that this might entitle him to United States citi-
zenship. Madar, Sr. learned of this possibility through his son’s 
immigration proceedings in the 1990s. In one proceeding, 
Madar, Sr. swore in an affidavit that the political circumstances 
of post-war Czechoslovakia would have made compliance with 
retention requirements difficult, if not impossible. Madar, Sr. 
observed that he would have had to reside in the United States 
for at least some time, but the Czech communist government 
would have prevented that—either by proscribing his emigra-
tion outright or making it so costly as to be practically impos-
sible. 
 
Madar sought a declaration from the District Court that 
his father constructively retained United States citizenship and 
transmitted that citizenship to him, making Madar ineligible 
for removal. The District Court denied Madar’s request. It held 
that even if Madar, Sr. had retained his citizenship under an 
equitable theory that excused his non-compliance with statu-
tory physical presence requirements, Madar, Sr. did not trans-





The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253(a). “[W]e review a district court’s legal con-
clusions de novo.” United States v. Green, 898 F.3d 315, 317 




Madar argues that his father was a United States citizen 
(because his father retained his citizenship), so he is as well 
(because his father transmitted that retained citizenship). 
Madar grounds this claim on an administrative decision involv-
ing the constructive physical presence doctrine, Matter of Na-
varrete, 12 I. & N. Dec. 138 (BIA 1967). Madar contends that 
Navarrete remains good law and controls the transmission-of-
citizenship question here. Madar also argues that the District 
Court treated him differently than the petitioner in Navarrete, 
violating his equal protection rights. 
 
Madar can be a citizen only if his father was.  But even 
assuming that Madar’s father retained his citizenship, he did 
not transmit that citizenship to Madar for at least two reasons. 
First, the applicable immigration statutes contained limited ex-
ceptions to the law’s physical presence requirements, and like 
all other courts of appeals to consider this issue, we decline to 
read broader equitable exceptions into the law. Second, Navar-
rete does not apply because no United States government error 
interrupted citizenship retention and transmission. 
 
In determining whether Madar is a citizen, we look to 
the statute in effect at the time of Madar’s birth. Runnett v. 
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Shultz, 901 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The applicable law 
for transmitting citizenship to a child born abroad when one 
parent is a U.S. citizen is the statute that was in effect at the 
time of the child’s birth.”). Madar was born in Czechoslovakia 
in 1964. Assuming that his father was a citizen at the time of 
Madar’s birth, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
controls Madar’s citizenship status. That law provided that sev-
eral categories of individuals “shall be nationals and citizens of 
the United States at birth,” including: 
 
a person born outside the geographical limits of 
the United States and its outlying possessions of 
parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a 
citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth 
of such person, was physically present in the 
United States or its outlying possessions for a pe-
riod or periods totaling not less than ten years, at 
least five of which were after attaining the age of 
fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of 
honorable service in the Armed Forces of the 
United States by such citizen parent may be in-
cluded in computing the physical presence re-
quirements of this paragraph. 
 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 
tit. III, ch. 1, § 301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 235 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(a)(7), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)) (the 
“1952 Act”). By its plain terms, the 1952 Act imposed physical 
presence requirements, but provided an exception for members 
of the United States military. Congress later added a second 
exception for “periods of employment with the United States 
Government.” See Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-770, 80 
Stat. 1322 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7)). 
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 In an earlier proceeding, Madar’s father admitted that 
he failed to satisfy these physical presence requirements, as he 
lived in Czechoslovakia—and after its dissolution, Slovakia—
his entire life. For Madar to have citizenship, we would have 
to determine that Madar’s father was constructively present in 
the United States, retained his citizenship, and transmitted that 
citizenship to Madar. Other courts of appeals have uniformly 
rejected extending the constructive physical presence doctrine 
to transmission of citizenship, and the reasoning of those deci-
sions is instructive here. 
 
 First, the plain meaning of the 1952 Act precludes 
Madar’s transmittal argument. “Statutory construction must 
begin with the language employed by Congress and the as-
sumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately 
expresses the legislative purpose.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
557 U.S. 167, 175–76 (2009) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. 
Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)). Un-
der the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
we presume that “[t]he expression of one thing implies the ex-
clusion of others.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law 107 (2012). The 1952 Act, as amended, identifies just two 
exceptions to the physical presence requirement: for service in 
the armed forces or government employment. “[T]he existence 
of these two articulated exceptions to the physical presence re-
quirements undermines [the] argument that this Court should 
add a third ‘circumstances beyond control’ exception.” Tullius 
v. Albright, 240 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001); see also 
Drozd v. I.N.S., 155 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
Congress “expressly specified certain exceptions from the 
physical presence requirement” and declining to read addi-
tional exceptions into the statute). Like all other circuits to ad-
dress the issue, we decline to venture beyond the statutory text 
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to import Madar’s proposed hardship exception.1 Such an ap-
proach would cut against the statute’s plain language, case law 
construing the statute, and basic interpretive principles. 
 
In declining to extend the constructive physical pres-
ence doctrine, courts have noted that retention cases and trans-
mission cases involve different interests. Because “courts have 
traditionally hesitated to find that Congress could take away 
citizenship without the citizen’s consent,” they may find “con-
structive residence in order to preserve an individual’s reten-
tion of citizenship.” Runnett, 901 F.2d at 784 (citing Rogers v. 
Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 821–22 (1971)). But this concern does 
                                              
1 Madar tries to escape this plain statutory language by 
arguing that Congress has generally loosened statutory resi-
dency or physical presence requirements over the years, and 
that we should join this trend to decide the citizenship question 
in his favor. This evolving-standards argument fails as both an 
interpretive and historical matter. For starters, Madar con-
cedes—as he must—that the 1952 Act applies. Later-enacted 
immigration statutes irrelevant to the transmission issue cannot 
disturb the clear language of the 1952 Act. And as an empirical 
matter, the history of the immigration laws hardly shows a lin-
ear trend toward liberalizing residency or physical presence re-
quirements. In fact, the 1952 Act itself represented a tightening 
of requirements, as “Congress enacted the continuous-physi-
cal-presence requirement in 1952 in response to abuses of the 
more lenient ‘residence’ requirement.” I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 
464 U.S. 183, 198 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring). Besides 
undermining Madar’s evolving-standards argument, this 
change in language further “compel[s] a strict adherence to the 
plain terms of the Act.” Drozd, 155 F.3d at 87. 
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“not exist for the transmission of citizenship where citizenship 
is simply not being conferred.” Id. 
 
As for Madar’s contention that Navarrete supports his 
transmission-of-citizenship argument, he ignores that the deci-
sion turned on a government error. In Navarrete, children born 
in Mexico claimed that their mother was a United States citi-
zen, retained that citizenship through constructive physical 
presence in the United States, and transmitted that citizenship 
to them. 12 I. & N. Dec. at 142. The Board of Immigration 
Appeals agreed. Id. Although the mother did not actually fulfill 
the physical presence requirements of the 1952 Act, that was 
only because she “was prevented, in September 1954, from 
coming to the United States to reside permanently, by a United 
States official acting under an interpretation of the law later 
conceded by the Government to be erroneous.” Id. Had the 
United States official not made this mistake, the mother could 
“have completed the period of physical presence necessary to 
insure retention of her United States citizenship,” and that “pe-
riod of physical presence would have qualified her to pass on 
citizenship at birth to” her children. Id. 
 
Here, by contrast, the United States government made 
no mistake. Madar’s father was unable to retain citizenship be-
cause the political leadership of Soviet-era Czechoslovakia al-
legedly would have thwarted any attempt to live in the United 
States. Madar does not point to any United States government 
misconduct that caused his father’s citizenship to lapse, and 
courts have interpreted Navarrete to be limited to just that sce-
nario. See Tullius, 240 F.3d at 1321; Drozd, 155 F.3d at 88; 
Runnett, 901 F.2d at 784 n.3. Thus, Navarrete does not apply 
here for the same reason it did not apply in Tullius, Drozd, or 
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Runnett: No government error prevented Madar’s father from 
retaining citizenship.2 
 
Navarrete’s inapplicability also forecloses Madar’s 
equal protection argument. In short, Madar claims that because 
Navarrete applied the constructive physical presence doctrine 
to citizenship transmittal, but the District Court declined to do 
so here, the District Court violated his equal protection rights. 
See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 (“No State shall … deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”). Madar appears to raise a class-of-one equal protection 
claim. We have explained that “[t]o state a claim under a class 
of one theory, ‘a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant 
treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the 
defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational 
basis for the difference in treatment.’” Newark Cab Ass’n v. 
City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hill 
v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 
Madar was not treated differently than anyone similarly 
situated. Unlike in Navarrete, no United States official made 
                                              
2 To be fair, Navarrete suggests in dicta that it could 
apply more broadly. See 12 I. & N. Dec. at 142 (“Constructive 
residence and physical presence … normally come into play in 
situations where actual residence or physical presence were 
prevented by circumstances beyond the individual’s control, or 
by reliance upon erroneous information received from a United 
States official.”) (emphasis added). Despite that disjunctive, 
Navarrete’s holding was based on a United States “official act-
ing under an interpretation of the law later conceded by the 
Government to be erroneous.” Id. 
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an error that prevented Madar or his father from obtaining cit-
izenship. Thus, Madar’s equal protection argument fails the 
first prong of this test. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The District Court properly determined that the con-
structive physical presence doctrine does not apply here to 
transmit United States citizenship under the 1952 Act. So we 
will affirm the District Court’s denial of Madar’s claim for de-
claratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
